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Religion and Violence in the Horn of Africa: Trajectories of
Mimetic Rivalry and Escalation between ‘Political Islam’
and the State
Jon Abbink
African Studies Centre, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Religiously inspired violence is a global phenomenon and connects
to transnational narratives, necessitating comparative analysis of
socio-historical context and patterns of ideological mobilization.
Northeast Africa hosts several radical-extremist and terrorist
groups, mostly of Muslim persuasion, tuned in to these global
narratives while connecting to local interests. Christian radicalism
and violence also occur but are less ideologically consistent and
less widespread. I examine key aspects of the current role and
ideological self-positioning of Islamist radicalism in state contexts,
comparing Somalia, affected by Islamist violence since the late
1990s, and Ethiopia, where Islam’s mobilization followed a
different path and where the state so far contained politicization
and open radicalism of Muslim groups. A brief contrastive case
from Nigeria is also provided. It is observed that Islam, while of
course not ‘equaling’ violence, easily provides a militant political
theology, frequently instrumentalized in conflicts and situations of
(perceived) grievance, and via mimetic rivalry then becomes
radically ideological. Securitized response patterns of state
authorities toward militancy play a role in furthering violent
radicalization. I follow a sociological-anthropological approach but
also refer to key aspects of national-legal frameworks regarding
state and religion, next to societal and political bases of Muslim
militant mobilization for collective aims and self-presentation.
Introduction
Phenomena of religiously inspired violence and extremism1 across the world have
evoked an enormous wave of media attention and academic studies in recent decades.
While these studies yielded major insights into the societal-historical and socio-
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Jon Abbink g.j.abbink@asc.leidenuniv.nl African Studies Centre, Leiden University, P.O. Box 9555,
Leiden, RB 2300, The Netherlands
1‘Religious violence’ is a problematic term, although I do not agree with William T. Cavanaugh, ‘The Myth of Religious Vio-
lence’ in Joel Hodge, et al. (eds) Does Religion Cause Violence? Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Violence and Religion in the
Modern World (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), pp. 7–24. The term ‘extremism’ is often used in describing radical
religious groups and can be held to define a mode of uncompromising, supremacist thinking (and sometimes violent
practice) refusing dialogue or exchange and which holds no bars on advancing the adherents’ own views, seeing the
end as justifying all means. Cf. A.P. Schmid, ‘Introduction’ in A.P. Schmid (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism
Research, pp. 25–26.
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psychological factors that generate it, good predictive or explanatory models on the
emergence and decline of religiously phrased extremism and violence remain a challenge,
especially on a country basis. In general, analysts point to contexts of accelerated globa-
lization, persistent inequality, closed peer group socialization, and growing tensions
between faith or ethno-regional communities. These often overlap and are fueled by
foreign religious influence, money flows and ideological currents as well as migratory
activists joining armed struggles abroad. But the presence of these factors in itself
does not make for sufficient explanation, let alone for developing strategies to defuse
or prevent religiously motivated violence.
Since about two decades, this kind of violence is also rapidly expanding in Africa,2
although it is not clear whether there are specific ‘African traits’ in this violence. This
paper addresses some recent processes of religious radicalization, extremism and violence
in Africa, with a special focus on Islam, taking Somalia and Ethiopia as case studies, with
comparative notes on Nigeria, and contends that the equilibrium of state law (enforce-
ment) and contentious ideological struggle is crucial. The constitutional-legal framework
of religion and state-religion relations will therefore be discussed. To catch the dynamics of
armed struggle vs. accommodation, one must also look for contributing societal con-
ditions of (perceived) marginalization, poverty, inequality, etc., as ‘drivers’ for recruitment
of perpetrators; they often fuel the discursive formation of religious extremism, getting
‘translated’ into violent political activity. But once triggered in contexts of problematic
societal conditions, this violent activity requires analysis of its religiously framed ideologi-
cal mechanisms.
The Horn of Africa provides a useful contrasting case to West Africa, on which most
discussions of religious-political activism and terror movements have centered. The
regions differ in religious composition and historical traditions of both Islam and Chris-
tianity but have both an indigenous dynamic that merits some comparison, notably the
light of accelerating global influences of recent decades. This juxtaposition (partly retained
here in the brief comparison below with the situation in Jos, Nigeria) extends the domain
of study on possible underlying reasons for ‘radicalization’ and the recourse to religiously-
styled violence. Globalization in the last thirty years has no doubt meant ‘contagion’:
intensified contexts of interaction and ‘mirroring’ behavior and bringing together pre-
viously distinct entities—from countries to classes to youth to social and religious move-
ments—in interactive spaces, where rivalry based on perceived and real differences or
‘grievances’ emerge and are acted out in imitative fashion.3 While globalized spaces led
to a gradual decline of differences, via the spread of education, use of technology, econ-
omic links, and more wealth, at the same time new rivalries emerge and are inadvertently
also used to (re)assert identity difference.4 Much of this re-assertion occurs via public acti-
vism and violent acts couched in religious terms. Terrorism experts tell us how ‘modern’
the religion-inspired extremists of today often are: well-educated, technologically savvy,
not poor and downtrodden, and with a knowledge of ‘Western’ culture and institutions.
2See Hans Krech, ‘The Growing Influence of Al-Qaeda on the African Continent’, Africa Spectrum, 46:1 (2011), pp. 125–137;
Abdisaid M. Ali-Koor, Islamist Extremism in East Africa (Washington, DC: African Center for Strategic Studies briefing,
2016).
3Cp. also: Paul Dumouchel, ‘Inside Out. Political Violence in the Age of Globalization’, Contagion. Journal of Violence, Mimesis
and Culture, 15–16 (2008–2009), pp. 173–184.
4Cp. René Girard, ‘On War and Apocalypse’, First Things, 195 (Aug.–Sept 2009), p. 17, http://www.firstthings.com/article/
2009/08/apocalypse-now.
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Also, as Kobo persuasively argued,5 in Africa, the emergence of a more Salafist, ‘Wahhab-
ist’,6 or fundamentalist Islam since colonial days, and posing itself against the traditions
and practices of an age-old ‘African Islam’, itself occurred in a ‘mirroring’ process vis-
à-vis the modernity of colonialism.
For religious communities in Africa there is no ‘escape’ from contemporary totalizing
processes of modernization in the form of ongoing globalization, forcing them to redefine
their traditions, values and self-expression vis-à-vis others. Religion-based militancy and
violence that frequently emerge here show themselves not to be a regression to old
forms of identity struggle, but as a modernizing response to seek or recover a new identity
and ‘purity’, usually with reference to ‘sacred values’, forming a transcendent motivational
model that commands strong allegiance.7 I contend that violent religious activism among
Muslims (the focus in this paper), either collective or individual,8 emanates from a fairly
unified narrative that connects all cases and works via ideological contagion and mimesis.
This also goes for the African cases referred to.
While religiously-inspired radical/violent movements are well-known in Africa—the
large majority of Islamist character—care is need in defining the terms and assessing
the wider political and historical context—different from that in the Middle East or
Europe—and obviously not all Muslim communities and leaders subscribe to extremist
thought and violent activism; many are neutral or try to counter it.9 Islam does not
equal ‘violence’,10 although it may have more a more ‘elective affinity’ toward militancy
and violent reprisal in perceived conditions of threat.11 Primarily, Islam is to be seen as
a religious system or civilization and a supernatural frame of meaning and way of life
for masses of people, that always interacted with other faith groups and the state. The con-
frontation with ‘modernity’ in a general sense also has led to genuine religious self-exam-
ination,12 and in the case of many Muslim elites to a quest for a ‘return’ to origins and
5See Ousman Kobo, ‘The Development of Wahhabi Reforms in Ghana and Burkina Faso, 1960–1990: Elective Affinities
between Western-educated Muslims and Islamic Scholars’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 52:3 (2009),
pp. 504–505.
6The concept of ‘Wahhabism’ is widely used in scholarly literature (see previous note, and also the Glossary in A.P. Schmid,
ed., The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (London—New York, 2011) on p. 685 (‘Salafia Jihadia—Wahhabi jiha-
dist doctrine exported from Saudi Arabia since the 1990s’.) and p. 701. But it is of course contested, first and foremost by
Salafists and Muslim purists (despite that they are often avid followers of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrines). One
might describe it also as political Salafism, Saudi style.
7As emphasized in the research by Scott Atran, et al., ‘Devoted Actors Fight for Close Comrades and Sacred Cause’, Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111:50 (2014), pp. 17702–17703. M. Juergensmeyer spoke of the attitude of
‘moral presumption’ of terrorists (in his major book Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd
ed. [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003], p. 11).
8Including the ‘lone wolf’ attacks.
9See, e.g., Sani Umar, ‘Salafi Narratives against Violent Extremism in Nigeria’, Lagos—Abuja: Centre for Democracy and
Development, CDD Monograph 1 (2015); Anon, ‘The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-Radicalism
in Nigeria: a Case Study of Boko Haram’, Journal of Religion in Africa, 42 (2012), pp. 118–144.
10Cp. Lamin Sanneh, Beyond Jihad. The Pacifist Tradition in West African Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); and
Jon Abbink, ‘Muslim Monasteries? Some Aspects of Religious Culture in Northern Ethiopia’, Aethiopica, 11 (2008), pp. 117–
133. ‘Sufi’ sheikhs that I interviewed during fieldwork in rural Wollo, northern Ethiopia, in 2004, 2008 and 2012 did not
appreciate violent jihad at all. The dubious passages in the Qur’an on the use of violence (e.g. (2:191, 9:5, 9:29, 9:30, 5:33,
22:19, 8:65, or 8:12) must be seen in historical context, although Islamists and Muslim exegetes would not agree.
11Cf. J.D. Wright, ‘Why is Contemporary Religious Terrorism Predominantly Linked to Islam? Four Possible Psychosocial
Factors’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 10:1 (2016), pp. 19–31; and J. Liddle, K. Machluf, and T.K. Shackelford, ‘Understanding
Suicide Terrorism: Premature Dismissal of the Religious-Belief Hypothesis’, Evolutionary Psychology, 8:3 (2010), pp. 343–
345.
12Compare the analysis in A.A. Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
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sources, hence to follow and be inspired by the Salaf al-Sālih ïn (the ‘pious forefathers/
righteous predecessors’ of early Islam).
Muslim life in the Horn of Africa has shown remarkable and rich variety and is not by
definition ‘politicized’; it is more of a communal, social identity. The same goes for Chris-
tianity, in its (Ethiopian-) Orthodox and other forms. Many Muslim communities have
long-standing traditions of interaction and toleration vs. non-Muslims, although relations
are never ‘conflict-free’.13 Crucial for communal peace and ‘getting along’ are: (a) an
underlying, shared social structure of accommodation, and (b) in modern conditions, con-
ducive state policies vis-à-vis religious identities, with juridical oversight and implemen-
tation of the constitutional mandate regarding (tolerance of) religion.
While one may cast doubt on the terms ‘religious extremism’ and ‘religious violence’, it
is a fact that many religious movements and leaders throughout African history have
explicitly and often easily resorted to violent means as a tool to realize political ends,
with justification given in religious terms.14 This goes especially for Muslims ( jihad15)
but regularly also for Christians. Although of course Africa is not unique here, since a
couple of decades there seems to be a resurgence of religion as political narrative,16 paral-
leling developments in Asia and the Near East, with a concomitant rise in militancy and/or
terrorist action.
Theory and definitions
Recent developments in the field of religion and violence in Northeast Africa show pat-
terns and trajectories also recognized elsewhere on the continent, like in Northern
Nigeria, Mali after the collapse of the state, and in East Africa (with growing militant
youth movements, mainly of Islamic bent). While primarily political-anthropological in
nature, my theoretical approach to the unfolding of religion-based violence in Northeast
Africa owes much to R. Girard’s well-known model of ‘mimetic rivalry’ in human behav-
ior.17 Such rivalry is also exercised in the domain of religious relations. Communities,
movements and leaders often fall into a discourse of imitative identity struggle, based
13See Jon Abbink, ‘An Historical-Anthropological Approach to Islam in Ethiopia: Issues of Identity and Politics’, Journal of
African Cultural Studies, 11:2 (1998), pp. 109–124.
14Cp. Shmuel Bar, Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2006, Paper no. 1,
Series no. 1). Even Sunni Islam’s center Al Azhar in Cairo was not immune to religious rulings that were highly question-
able, e.g. condoning violence; see: Raymond Ibrahim, ‘Egyptian Cleric: ISIS Grows Out of Islamic Mainstream’, Middle East
Forum, 25 November 2015, http://www.meforum.org/blog/2015/11/isis-byproduct. Also the well-known Shafi’i manual of
religious law Reliance of the Traveller by Ahmed Ibn Naqib (14th century), certified as authoritative by Al-Azhar, approves
of violent jihad.
15Originally meaning (personal) ‘effort, striving, exertion’, but after the conquest of Mecca by the prophet Mohammed in
630 CE it became already identified with (offensive) militant violent struggle on behalf of the faith; see M.C. Bassiouni,
‘Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Self-defense to Revolutionary and Regime-change Political Violence’, Chicago
Journal of International Law, 8:1 (2007), pp. 129–130. It was further theorized as such by the Muslim theologian
A. ibn Taimiyya (1261–1328). Cp. E. Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1990), p. 101.
16A few examples: J. Garnett and S.L. Hausner, eds, Religion in Diaspora. Migration, Diasporas and Citizenship (London: Pal-
grave-Macmillan, 2015); M. Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 4th ed. (Ber-
keley: University of California Press, 2017); P. Mandaville and S. Hamid, Islam as Statecraft: How Governments Use Religion
in Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings, 2018); J. Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’, Philosophia Africana, 8:2
(2009), pp. 99–109.
17René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, translated by. P. Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); see also
H. Tinq, ‘Ce Qui se Joue Aujourd’hui Est une Rivalité Mimétique à l’Échelle Planétaire’, Le Monde, 5 November 2001, and
Jean-Marc Bourdin, ‘The Rivalry of Equals: A Girardian Political Anthropology’, Cités, 53 (2013), pp. 33–40.
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on differentiation and competition, whereby the ‘gain’ of the one is seen as ‘loss’ of the
other.18 The modern, post-colonial state context in Africa has made such rivalries more
relevant due to the political advantages of gaining more power or symbolic dominance
at the national level. This does, however, not mean that the religiously styled violence is
always directly grievance-based. ‘Grievance’ is a familiar trope in many analyses adopting
a ‘victimhood’ perspective,19 but ideology and sacred values play as important a role,
especially when held as supreme above those of all other groups. Many violent activists
could rather said to be ‘glory-based’—on a quest for ‘purity’ and ‘martyrdom’. I also
follow Girard in not assuming beforehand that religion per se is the direct cause of vio-
lence20—it is at most an indirect one, because it is (situated) human beings that, for a
variety of reasons, perpetrate the violence.21 Girard has controversially contended that
notably sacrificial religious rituals were forms of contained violence, which unwittingly
brought it under control. Once ‘exposed’ or religiously delegitimized, however, violence
can go on in vicious cycles and move ‘toward extremes’. Mimetic rivalry mechanisms—
inherent in human society—can easily become embroiled in religious conflict and when
this happens, aggressive competition and violence are set to continue.
Finally, the interpretation of ‘religious violence’ in Africa followed here assumes a
crucial role for the state and its legal–juridical institutions (or lack thereof) in influencing
and conditioning religious politics and tensions. This leads to an additional theoretical
perspective, that of political systems analysis. There is surely a relationship between
state injustice and incapacity one the one hand and the emergence of alternative political
programs and ideologies on the other, including religion-based radicalism or violent mili-
tancy. According to the empirical evidence, this holds especially for Muslim (Islamist)
groups, both in Muslim-majority and Muslim–minority countries. But not all violent or
extremist action of this kind is directly ‘caused’ by state oppression or failure. In this
paper I will refer to the legal framework of religion-state relations as laid down in consti-
tutions and laws of the two main countries discussed. In thus exploring the formative
impact of political and societal factors—i.e. allowing ‘history’ in—we can, via assessing
the formation and expression of mimetic rivalries and their violent effects, also answer
the need to extend Girard’s a-historical theory.
The definition of ‘religious violence’ and ‘religious extremism’ is complex. I define the
first concept as: ‘contested armed action to hurt, incapacitate or kill others, based on ideas
18I do not necessarily adopt the theoretical point of Girard that all religion originates in unifying sacrificial rites via scape-
goat mechanisms around a collectively identified innocent victim. But the generative principle of mimetic rivalry and the
processes set in motion by it seem a universal feature of the human experience. It recalls what Hobbes said on mimesis in
his Leviathan (1651) and what Spinoza said in the Ethics (1677) in III. 31, 32 (on ‘envy’) and 37. Mimetic rivalry is easily
marshalled in identity politics. See for a critique on the universality of the ‘scapegoating’ mechanism: R. Landes, ‘A Mil-
lennial Critique of René Girard’s Thesis on Scapegoating’ (2008), http://www.theaugeanstables.com/2008/09/01/a-
millennial-critique-of-rene-girard%E2%80%99s-thesis-on-scapegoating/ (accessed June 5, 2017).
19Cf. Moses E. Ochonu dismantling this argument in the case of Nigeria’s ‘Boko Haram’, in ‘Toward a Better Understanding
of Boko Haram’ (2014), http://theafricacollective.com/2014/06/18/toward-a-better-understanding-of-boko-haram/?
relatedposts_hit=1&relatedposts_origin=467&relatedposts_position=0.
20René Girard, ‘Violence and Religion: Cause or Effect?’ The Hedgehog Review, 6 (2004). See also: Hodge, et al, op. cit. (see
note 1). Girard posits that the gradual abandonment of religious rituals with real or symbolic sacrificial violence has
unleashed other forms of violence in society, with no bounds, destructive, and tending toward extremes (ibid.).
Compare also his Achever Clausewitz (Paris: Carnets Nord, 2007), pp. 12–13; and (Girard, op. cit., note 4 above).
21A strong contrary view is taken by many analysts, including Hector Avalos, Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence
(New York: Prometheus Books, 2005). Cf. also: Lorne L. Dawson, ‘Discounting Religion in the Explanation of Home-grown
Terrorism: A Critique’, in J.R. Lewis (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Religion and Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), pp. 32–45.
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justified by religion or related supernatural appeals, supposedly giving it legitimacy beyond
human motives’. Religious extremism is: ‘supremacist, aggressively voiced ideas or ideol-
ogies rooted in supernatural notions, based on convictions immune to debate, dialogue,
reflexivity or criticism and denigrating non-group members’. Extremism can lead to
violent action to hurt or eliminate others, but it is first and foremost a mindset exercised
on or toward others. In a sense, all ‘religious violence’ (such as the religiously-motivated
‘suicide terrorism’ and mass-killing attacks as perpetrated by, e.g. the Afghan Taliban, the
Somali Al-Shabaab or the Nigerian Boko Haram) is based on extremism, but not all extre-
mism is or leads directly to violence. E.g. ‘Salafists’ are often extremists in their exclusivist,
supremacist and frequently takfiri attitudes towards others (i.e. labeling and denigrating
Sufi and other mainstream Muslims as well as non-Muslims as kafir, ‘unbelievers’), but
they are not all violent or ‘terrorist’.22 As various authors noted, the categorization of
Salafists as (violent) extremists and Sufists as accommodative and peaceful is doubtful.
In African history these categories have shown to be fluid.23
Descriptions of what we in the rest of the paper will call ‘religious violence/extremism’
abound in the recent political science and sociological literature and are often similar in
nature, as are the motives and reasons given to explain it: discrimination, repression,
material grievances, feelings of humiliation of the faithful, or socio-economic inequality
and marginalization. As noted above, my take will be that to explain Islamist violence
only with a ‘grievance-based’ or ‘structural violence’ model, i.e. to label the perpetrators
always as ‘victims’, is not satisfactory. There may indeed be a combination of perceptions
and experiences of marginalization,24 relative poverty, social inequality, gender inequal-
ity25 and socialization problems in Muslim countries, next to psychological feelings of
being victimized or slighted—whether justified or not. But these elements are more
often than not augmented by emphatic political-ideological justification based on religious
argument, regularly with (selective) reference to certain suras in the Qur’an.W. Palaver has
contended26 that the popularity of ‘vengeful religious lament’ (using Elias Canetti’s term,
in Crowds and Power, 1960) is clear, and has become ‘ … a common dimension of contem-
porary incidents of religiously—and also secular—motivated violence, especially of terror-
ism’ (p. 10). This holds both for international terrorism as well as for religious violence/
extremism within states. Religiously-inspired violent or terrorist movements/activists
are more often than not well-versed in ideological-theological knowledge and reasoning.27
22Terrorism definitions are contested, although A. Schmid has tried to draw up a more encompassing one in his ‘The
Definition of Terrorism’, in A.P. Schmid, (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, pp. 39–98. It includes
‘state-sponsored’ terrorism (ibid., p. 86). The search for an ACD (= academic consensus definition, ibid., p. 42) seems
to aim for an essentialist definition, while a nominal one would suffice. I define terrorism here nominally here as: ‘the
unlawful use by state or non-state actors or groups of indiscriminate, unexpected violence against persons or property,
with the aim to maim, intimidate, kill, spread fear, or coerce people or governments and/or civilians, often done for ‘pol-
itical’ aims’.
23Cf. Terje Østebø, ‘African Salafism: Religious Purity and the Politicization of Purity’, Islamic Africa, 6 (2015), pp. 1–29; also
Mark Woodward, et al. (eds), ‘Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom’, Perspectives on Ter-
rorism, 7 (2013), www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/311/html.
24See for instance, Mohamed Yahya, ‘African Countries are Particularly Vulnerable to Violent Terrorism. How to Change this’,
World Economic Forum, 15 January 2017, www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/african-countries-are-particularly-
vulnerable-to-violent-terrorism-how-to-change-this.
25Cf. Ronald W. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘The True Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Policy, 135 (2003), pp. 62–70.
26Wolfgang Palaver, ‘Mimetic Theories of Religion and Violence’, in M. Jerryson, M. Juergensmeyer, and M. Kitts (eds), The
Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 10.
27The Muslim tradition does not lack text sources and judgements which can be construed as supportive of ‘religious’ vio-
lence; cf. Shmuel Bar, ‘The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism’, Hoover Institution Policy Review, 125 (2004), pp. 27–37.
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The African context: historical canvas, contemporary dynamics
In Africa, religion-based violence and extremism in ideological, organized form were
known well before 9 November 2001. For example, in the Muslim conquest of North
Africa in the 7th–9th centuries, the jihadist campaigns in West Africa in the 17th–19th
centuries (e.g. the Fulani-based jihad of ‘Uthman dan Fodio or of Shehu Ahmadu
Lobbo of Macina), or the 16th century war (from 1529 to 1543) in the Ethiopian-
Somali border areas, led by the Harar-Somali Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi, that spread
to the highland interior and almost destroyed the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia and
its religious infrastructure (churches, monasteries). These devastating episodes were
motivated with calls to supreme religious identity and authority (of Islam),28 but always
intermingled with territorial, economic and political power motives. Both expanding
Christianity (notably after colonialism started, but long before that in Egypt, Sudan and
medieval Ethiopia, the latter conducting armed campaigns against Muslim principalities
on its borders) and Islamic conversions created a landscape of tension and competition
between different ethnic and religious communities that consolidated societal pluralism.
In the colonial period since the late nineteenth century, Muslim populations were con-
fronted with modernity in the form of new, authoritarian administration, education, and
other religions or political ideologies, inducing many to adopt the new ways and others to
develop counter-narratives of resistance. The colonial and post-colonial context was
important, and many (violent) anti-colonial resistance movements became infused with
a religious character. One example is the Mahdist movement in the Turco-Egyptian
Sudan since 1881, leading to a major armed revolt (and rule in Khartoum) that also dev-
astated parts of North-western Ethiopia and was finally defeated in 1898 by the British. In
Somali areas there was local resistance to the British and Italians from 1900 to 1920 under
a religiously inspired revivalist leader, SayyidMuhammad Abdullah Hassan, who revolted
as much in the name of Islam as in that of the colonized Somali nation.29 In former British
colonies, branches of the Muslim Brotherhood—created in 1928 in Egypt as part of the
‘Islamic awakening’—were founded, although these were by far not all aimed towards vio-
lence. There emerged, however, an important strand of Islamist thinking and activism in
the twentieth century, examples of which were Egyptian authors such as Egyptian Sayyid
Qutb (1906–66), Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (d. 1982), or Yusuf Al-Qaradawi
(1926–),30 and Pakistani theologian Said Abul Al’a al-Maududi (1903–79), all of them
marked by jihadist rather than ‘moderate’ views, seeing jihad as primarily a form of
violent struggle (qital).
Guided by religious elites, many Muslim populations were thus confirmed in, rather
than alienated from, their religious identity and often they came to see their faith as an
ideological bulwark and tool against ‘Western modernity’—however diffuse this concept
was. In postcolonial Africa, state authority was much contested and the political-economic
28See Chihab ad-Din, Futūh al-H abaša (The Conquest of Abyssinia), edited by P.L. Stenhouse and R. Pankhurst (Hollywood,
Ca.—Addis Ababa: Tsehai Publishers, 2003), p. 21, 26, 41, 58, 80, 384.
29Said Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayid Mahammed Abdille Hassan (Cambridge: CUP, 1982);
Jon Abbink, ‘Dervishes, Moryaan and Freedom Fighters: Cycles of Rebellion and the Fragmentation of Somali Society,
1900–2000’, in J. Abbink, et al. (eds), Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History (Leiden: Brill, 2003),
pp. 328–365. The Sayyid also had many Somali enemies, which probably became his undoing.
30An allegedly mainstream and quite influential Muslim thinker. For a taste of his thinking, see: www.youtube.com/watch?
v=eDtSqqciar0; and www.youtube.com/watch?v=huMu8ihDlVA (accessed June 5, 2017).
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record of most regimes disappointing. But activism and political resistance were initially
more inspired by Socialist ideals, democratic aspirations and ethno-regal identities than by
religious narratives. In the late 1980s, religiously inspired social movements and revolts
emerged in the crumbling political order in Africa, or rather, came out in the open.
The chief event was the take-over of power in 1989 in Sudan by the National Islamic
Front (NIF, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), under General Omar al Bashir and
NIF-religious leader Hassan al Tourabi, installing the first Islamist regime in Africa. In
other African countries, Islam-inspired social movements and youth organizations also
emerged (in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, or Somalia), but they competed with other political
organizations. Many African Muslims were educated at the Islamic University of Medina
and other colleges in Saudi Arabia, and upon return to their countries gave an impetus to
Salafist outlooks. A similar story can be told about the ‘International University of Africa’
in Khartoum, founded in 1977 with Saudi money and strongly expanded by the al
Tourabi/al Bashir regime in Sudan.
After ‘9/11’, the discourse of violence emerged and was propagated by religious-terror-
ist movements and activists in Africa. Global examples, catalyzed by the Al Qa’eda
network (not only the US events, but also those in the Near East, Pakistan or Afghanistan),
were important. Such violence took on a different character, its ideology and symbolism of
‘martyrdom’ infused with deep mimetic rivalry and enmity versus the ‘religious others’,
often so as to deny them existence.31 Religion-based extremist/violent movements
emerged in many countries, from Somalia to Nigeria to Uganda to Burkina Faso.32 Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Din in Mali, Boko Haram (Nigeria), and Ansar
al-Shari’a (in at least five African countries) are among the movements now active.
They generalized religion-based ‘warfare’, and their narratives and activities had a
deeply contagious effect.33 In this respect, movements are ideologically connected and
appeal to a similar sub-text of grievances and resentment, converted into predominantly
Islamist war against ‘Others’ whose mere existence, let alone political system and laws, are
often seen as unacceptable. The starkest example of this is the Nigerian ‘Boko Haram’,34
whose leaders repeatedly made statements literally proclaiming this.35
Most Sub-Saharan African countries—except Somalia and Sudan,36 both with Islam as
state religion—have a secular constitution; i.e. no state religion is prescribed, even though
most of the countries have a clear denominational majority (Christian or Muslim). Levels
31See, for instance, the interesting paper by Wolfgang Palaver, ‘Enmity and Political Identity: Friend-enemy Patterns and
Religion’, Jnanadeepa—Pune Journal of Religious Studies, 8:1 (2005), pp. 39–49.
32See the map on: https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/militant-islamic-groups-as-of-Apr-2017-with-
bullets.pdf (accessed July 2, 2018).
33In October 2017 the first home-grown Islamist terror attack occurred in Mozambique, a country not known for any ‘anti-
Muslim’ repression (http://theconversation.com/why-islamist-attack-demands-a-careful-response-from-mozambique-
85504, accessed December 5, 2017).
34Their real name is a genuine Muslim one: Jama’atu Ahlu al-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad (= Association of the People of
the Sunna for Conversion and Jihad).
35In May 2014 chief commander A. Shekau, said:
Until we soak the ground of Nigeria with Christian blood and so-called Muslims contradicting Islam. After we have
killed, killed, killed, and get fatigued and wonder what to do with smelling of their corpses— smelling of Obama,
Bush and [then Nigerian president] Goodluck Jonathan— then we will open prison and imprison the rest. Infidels
have no value. See: https://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/who-real-abubakar-shekau-aka-abu-muhammad-
abubakar-bin-muhammad-boko-harams-renegade-warlord (accessed August 23, 2017)
36Sudan until the Spring of 2019 (when regime change occurred) had a problematic Islamist regime since 1989 that
wrought havoc and war in the region. See Suliman Baldo, Radical Intolerance: Sudan’s Religious Oppression and
Embrace of Extremist Groups (Washington, DC: The Enough Project, 2017).
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of popular religious adherence, however, are very high; in other words, society is not
‘secular’. The Pew Research Center 2010 survey report on religion in Africa found that
the vast majority of Africans were deeply committed to Islam or Christianity, and that
many even thought that the shari’a or the Bible, respectively, should be made official
law in the country.37
Still, the course that religious militancy or violence takes is quite divergent in the
different African countries, showing a variety of local historical contexts, modes of inter-
action with the wider society, and complex internal relations, i.e. within the religious com-
munities. A comparison of Somalia and Ethiopia makes this clear.
Somalia—Islamist terrorism challenging the state
Somalia has seen high levels of violence the past two decades with a persistent radical-Isla-
mist movement carrying out multiple violent attacks. Somalia is a majority Muslim
country; ca. 99% Somalis are Sunni (Shafi’i law tradition) and historically the mainstream
is of Sufi bent, with a strong role of the mystical orders like Qadiriyya, Ahmadiyya and
Tijjaniyya. Somali Islam always had a strong ‘national’ identity but since a couple of
decades it is more inspired by foreign Muslim thinkers and propagandists. After the
late 1980s the influence of ‘reformist’, i.e. puritanical Salafist and Muwahhidūn
(‘Wahhabism’)–inspired strands, has grown, especially since 1991 when the central state
collapsed and Islamic groups became stronger (Al Ittihad al Islami, Al Islah, and Hizbul
Islam).38
Since ca. 2005 the radical-Islamist movement Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahiddeen
(Movement of Young Jihad Combatants) is active in Somalia, pursing a most militant
and violent form of Islamist activism, with killings of Somalis (and foreigners) who do
not subscribe to its brand of Islam, and rejecting any form of democracy—seen as reli-
giously unacceptable because ‘man-made’. Al-Shabaab emerged as a successor movement
to the ‘Islamic Courts Union’ (ICU),39 a non-state alliance that had tried to install law and
order in Somalia in the post-1991 chaos (state collapse), based on religious (shari’a) pre-
cepts. They filled the space left after the demise of the abusive, violent reign of the Somali
clan-‘warlords’. While the ICU had made a promising start in restoring order and enfor-
cing law, the Islamist militia which later became Al-Shabaab claimed religious and politi-
cal supremacy and did not accept any effort to rebuild a new Somali government and state.
A long and controversial political process occurring since the mid-1990s, hesitantly sup-
ported by the UN and the international community, led to a Federal Government emer-
ging in August 2012; precarious, but on a relatively broad and more inclusive basis.
However, all through the process Al-Shabaab rejected this reconstitution of state authority
and kept fighting for a fully ‘Islamic regime’, claiming to represent the ‘real’ Islam in
Somalia.40 The movement acted mainly via intimidation and terror attacks on government
personnel, journalists, civilians, and clerics who opposed them,41 and also developed non-
37Pew Research Center, Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC, 2010), p. 10.
38Cf. Haggai Erlich, Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan (Boulder, Co.—London: Lynne
Rienner, 2010), chapter 7.
39In fact, emanating from a radical faction of the militia.
40In 2010 they incorporated the other radical-Islamist movement, Hizbul Islam.
41They also pioneered ‘suicide bombing’ in Somalia: the first one was on 18 September 2006.
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state predatory economic activities. They received a boost of nationalist support after
Ethiopia’s military invasion of Somalia in 2006 (‘at the request’ of a fledgling transitional
government in Mogadishu). Further support Al-Shabaab had on the ground rested on
providing services to rural people in the absence of the state, e.g. in the field of law and
order (mediating disputes), basic medical provisions, or market organization.42 But
broad support did not last. Their ideology of Islamist supremacism led them to use
crude violence to impose their version of Islam on all people and to attack or drive out
their rivals, Sufist clerics, and representatives of Somali transitional (since 2012 federal)
government. When violence (including h udūd punishments), extortion and child
soldier recruitment continued (up to today), it became difficult to see—also for most
Somalis—what Al-Shabaab’s legitimacy was, or how and why their (ill-elaborated) politi-
cal program should be realized. They never engaged in talks or negotiations with govern-
ment representatives or civic organizations, except local clan elders. Al-Shabaab’s reign
came to rest upon pervasive violent tactics and intimidation, both in its control of the
rural population and in its policies towards perceived competitors—the state, Sufist
leaders, dissenting clan representatives and associations, and foreigners (NGOs, UN,
AU peace-keeping forces).
A long string of terror attacks marks Al-Shabaab’s record to date, with next to federal
government personnel, media people and AMISOM soldiers, also thousands of civilians
killed. A characteristic operation was the 12 December 2009 suicide-bombing in Moga-
dishu ripping through a graduation ceremony of medical students, killing 24 people,
including future doctors, four government ministers, and three journalists. The govern-
ment at the time was led by a moderate Islamist, President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and
showed that Al-Shabaab in its self-declared ‘holy war’ had no qualms killing fellow-
Muslims and civilians. And in October 2017 a truck bombing of a Mogadishu market
area resulted in more than 500 people killed, many of them women and children. This
led to mass demonstrations against the movement, but the pattern of defying the
Somali government via constant bloodletting of non-combatants to show the powerless-
ness of the authorities has persisted. While Al-Shabaab lost much adherence and legiti-
macy among Somalis, it is not easily defeated.43
Perennial debate in- and outside Somalia concerns the issue of whether Al-Shabaab44
members ‘are Muslim or not’. They themselves of course claim they are, and all of their
statements refer to the Qur’an and Islamic law—the same body of religious thought
that their opponents in Somalia take as authoritative. So, it seems a question of interpret-
ation. No doubt Al-Shabaab takes an extremist interpretation, deviating from the Somali
and perhaps African Muslim mainstream. But it is similar to the Saudi-style ‘Muwahhi-
dūn’ (‘Wahhabi’) or Salafi tradition introduced in the eighteenth century in Arabia by
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792),45 later taken up by radical thinkers/
42See for their partly successful legitimation strategies and propaganda in the post-1991 Somali political void: Oscar
G. Mwangi, ‘State Collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia’, Politics, Religion & Ideology 13 (2012),
pp. 513–527.
43See Sunguta West, ‘The Resurgence of Al Shabaab’, Terrorism Monitor, 16 (2018), pp. 6–7.
44The name of course means The Youth, but they are no longer ‘youths’ and led by veteran hard-core Islamists, including
some Islamist clerics that returned from having lived abroad, e.g. in the UK and Sweden.
45Inspired by the radical Sunni theologian T. ibn Taimiyyah (1263–1328). M. ibn Abd al-Wahhab pursued his ‘reforms’ with
harsh means of repression, stoning, and killing of opponents, especially after his alliance with the Najd ruler, Muhammad
ibn Saud, in 1747. His active support of violent jihad is referred to in Hussein ibn Ghannam, Tarikh Najd (Riyadh: Dar al-
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theologians like Al’a al-Maududi (1903–79) and the Muslim Brotherhood founders and
adherents in the twentieth century—all hard-core proponents of a more political Islam
not eschewing religious violence. In 2013 a council of some 160 Somali mainstream
clerics issued a fatwa rejecting Al-Shabaab as ‘ … having strayed from the correct path
of Islam’ and as ‘a danger to the Islamic religion and the existence of the Somali
society’.46 But Al-Shabaab-sympathetic clerics denied its validity, suggesting Islam man-
dates their own interpretation. This is one illustration of the fact that, as Bonino recently
argued,47 there are different forms of ‘political Islam’: non-violent and violent (like Al
Shahaab).
In 2019 the Al Shabaab movement—with its leaders repeatedly targeted by USA special
forces and drones, as well as combated by the AMISOM peace-keeping forces—still
pursues its ideological-extremist agenda, vehemently anti-government (against any
form of government), anti-international peace-keeping forces, anti–UN and anti-main-
stream Somali Islam. Their political Islamism is uncompromising and their terrorist
tactics unchanged, always ‘justified’with appeals to Islam and ‘purity’. They see themselves
as ‘reformists’ and as the ‘real’ Muslims, with their violence as liberating and ‘cleansing’.
One of their aims is to unite the Somali clans and sub-clans under Islam (analogies are
drawn with the tribal jahiliyya—‘ignorance’, chaos—before the time of the Prophet
Muhammad in Arabia), and establish an exclusivist Islamist state: an extreme ‘Salafist’
movement strengthened by an appeal to foreign models (and funding). In 2012 Al-
Shabaab leaders had declared adherence to Al Qa’eda, and some sections in 2016
expressed loyalty to the ISIS (‘Da’esh’). In addition, they established links with the
Boko Haram in Nigeria and with related extremist groups like Al Hijra and Jaysh al
Ayman in Kenya.48
The Somali Federal Government (2012–) has not succeeded in establishing its authority
over all of Somalia in either the political or religious domain, and falls short of providing
services, education, etc. for citizens. Political space is still essentially contested and many
people are dependent on local customary and religious authorities for the maintenance of
law and order—which often works well. As noted above, in some areas Al-Shabaab was
able to offer this—on the basis of shari’a only, and under strongly coercive rule. They
also found support among youths because of their payment of allowances/salaries. The
government authorities and armed forces lack efficiency, predictability and unity, and
suffer from serious corruption.
Under the current Somali Federal Constitution (2012), Islam is the state religion. In
Article 2 (‘State and Religion’) it says: ‘(1) Islam is the religion of the State. (2) No religion
other than Islam can be propagated in the country. (3) No law can be enacted that is not
compliant with the general principles and objectives of shari’a’.49 This imposition of
Thuluthiyyah, 2010), vol. 2; and Uthman ibn Bishr, Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd (Riyadh: Matbu‘at Darat al-Malik ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz, 1982), vol. 1: p. 46, p. 65, pp. 69–72.
46See: ‘Somali Islamic Scholars Denounce al-Shabab in Fatwa’, BBC News, 12 September 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-24057725.
47Stefano Bonino, ‘Violent and Non-violent Political Islam in a Global Context’, Political Studies Review, 16:1 (2018), pp. 46–
59.
48Cf. Hassan J. Ndzovu, ‘The Rise of Jihad, Killing of “Apostate Imams” and Non-combatant Christian Civilians in Kenya: Al
Shabaab’s Redefinition of the Enemy on Religious Lines’, Journal for the Study of the Religions of Africa and its Diaspora, 3,
pp. 4–20. Also: Sunguta West, ‘Jaysh al-Ayman: a “Local Threat” in Kenya’, Terrorism Monitor, 16:8 (2018), pp. 3–5.
49In Art. 17, it says, somewhat contradictory, that ‘(1) Every person is free to practice his or her religion. 2) No religion other
than Islam can be propagated in the Federal Republic of Somalia’.
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Islam—in fact, a statement against religious freedom—reflects the adherence of 99% of
Somalis to Islam, but was probably included by the drafters to ideologically undercut the
then armed Islamist opposition (Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab). The Government wanted
to pre-empt any religious reasoning of the radical Islamists to claim legitimacy as the
‘real Islamic’ political leaders. Al-Shabaab, on the other hand, sees the constitution as a
‘godless document’ without validity because ‘man-made’ and not exclusively based on
shari’a. These attitudes give rise to continued rivalry about the definition and status of
Islam as a political force and thus to violent struggle to impose it. The terrorist agenda of
Islam as embodied by Al-Shabaab is contested but entrenched in Somali society—especially
among youth strata that have missed out on basic education for decades and are disoriented.
It continues to be in cyclical rivalry with both the federal state representatives and the main-
stream Sufi-oriented Muslims. As they both share the recognition of Islam as state religion
and of its major impact on national law and politics, in the long run a dialogue process
would seem the solution to engage both sides and negotiate to defuse the violent agendas.
Ethiopia—ambivalence of the secular constitutional order and
‘containment’ of Muslim mobilization
One third of Ethiopia’s population of ca. 105 mln. in 2018 is SunniMuslim, largely follow-
ing the Shafi’i school of legal thought. Sufism or mystical Islam has long been popular in
Ethiopia, with the Qadiriyya and the Tijjaniyya orders (turuq) widely present. Islam in
Ethiopia was always decentralized, knew regional varieties, and was deeply rooted in
the country, often in interaction with the Christian environment. Religious commitment
also varied significantly, with many practicing Islam in a relaxed and selective manner.
Islam gave rise to certain syncretic forms as well patterns of accommodation, as for
instance in the region of Wollo, where the faith first spread since the early 11th
century, and not via violence. Here a habitus of tolerance emerged in a pattern of long-
standing quotidian social practices. Religious identities were seen as shared heritage of
the region and no one seemed interested in emphasizing or sharpening the boundaries,
although rivalry was not absent.50
In the case of Islam, Ethiopia provides a case of state-religious community relations that
is in many ways the reverse of Somalia: no state religion, a balance of religious commu-
nities, with Islam not as a majority but as a large minority (34%), and strong state surveil-
lance and state pre-eminence over organized religion (also on Orthodox Christianity). In
recent decades Ethiopia has not been marked by escalating Christian or Islamist-inspired
terrorist violence, except a few series of burnings of (Sufi) mosques and churches and inci-
dents of seemingly targeted ‘religious killings’. The presence of small radical-militant
Muslim groups and Takfiris (radicals ‘excommunicating’ and declaring other Muslims
as ‘enemy’) was reported in the late 1990s51 but these were suppressed, and remnants
are monitored. Nevertheless, since 1991 a clear process of doctrinal radicalization
50See: Éloi Ficquet, ‘Patterns of Coexistence and Rivalry between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia. The Case of Wällo in
the Central Highlands’, Civiltà del Mediterraneo, 16–17 (2010), pp. 247–259.
51Takfir wal Hijjra extremist Muslim groups; locally called ‘Khawarijj’. See Dereje Feyissa, The Potential for and Signs of Reli-
gious Radicalization in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, Research Report Submitted to DFID-Ethiopia, March 2011), pp. 7–8, 16. In
2009 the Khawarijj announced that their members would refuse to pay taxes or hold Ethiopian ID-cards (ibid.).
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among Muslims occurred (Also among Protestant-Evangelical and Orthodox Christians,
in a largely reactive move).52
Ethiopia abolished the Orthodox-Christian religion as state religion in 1974 (Ethiopian
revolution era) and in the Socialist Constitution of 1984 religion and state were separated,
with most properties of the Orthodox Church confiscated and its leaders replaced or co-
opted. Muslims were given in principle equal rights and could form a representative
organization. The Ethiopian Constitution of 1995, introduced by the ethno-federal
regime of the ruling party EPRDF,53 continued the secular statute. Key is Art. 11: ‘1.
State and religion are separate. 2. There shall be no state religion. 3. The state shall not
interfere in religious matters and religion shall not interfere in state affairs’.54 What was
exactly meant by the latter remained unclear: what constitutes ‘interference’, and especially
when and how religion might be seen to interfere in state affairs (These were to be the
main issues in the later confrontations between Muslim community leaders/organizations
and the state authorities in the 2011–2015 period). In Art. 27, religious freedom was
further defined, e.g. in 27.1 the ‘ … freedom, either individually or in community with
others, and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching’, and in 27.2 to freely organize. But in Art. 27.5 it said:
Freedom to express or manifest one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such limit-
ations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, peace, health, edu-
cation, public morality or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, and to ensure the
independence of the state from religion.
This gave the state leeway to ‘monitor’ religious life and self-organizations in the light of
wider national aims, i.e. beyond the perceptions of the religious communities themselves.
The deciding role of the federal state was also enhanced by Art. 90.2: ‘Education shall be
provided in a manner that is free from any religious influence, political partisanship or
cultural prejudices’. I.e. all state-sponsored public education was to be free from undue
religious teachings and practices. Muslims protested against these regulations but were
not able to change them, and on a local, institutional level many of their demands (e.g.
for prayer spaces in schools/universities) were even met. A final interesting aspect of
the constitution is that religious law as such was not recognized except in the case of
the shari’a courts, for personal status/family law matters (in articles 34.5 and 78.5). As
Corazza has noted,55 here Islam is treated differently from other faiths (which do not
receive recognition; e.g. Orthodox church law is not mentioned), seemingly an infringe-
ment on the ‘secularity’ of the Constitution.
Since 1991, religious freedom as guaranteed in the above clauses was fully utilized and
multiple new religious actors emerged, both domestic and foreign. In Ethiopia, as in the
rest of Africa, religious freedom did not lead to a weakening of religion or of significant
52‘Radicalization’ here defined as a process of people developing towards an exclusivist-dogmatic and militant mindset,
with strong enemy images and (in the case of religion) forceful conversion purposes. Radicalisation does not equal extre-
mism, but is usually a preliminary stage to it.
53Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, the umbrella ethno-regional front with four parties with at its core
the militarily dominant TPLF, victorious after the civil war ending in May 1991. EPRDF was still the sole ruling party in
2018, but power within it shifted from the TPLF to three other constituent parties after February that year under the
new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who led the party into reform and a new name in November 2019: the Prosperity Party.
54For the text, see: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et007en.pdf.
55Marta T. Corazza, ‘State and Religion in the Constitution and Politics of Ethiopia’, European Journal for Church and State
Research, 9:1 (2002), p. 389.
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growth of agnostic or non-believing communities, but to more religious ‘identity politics’,
perhaps to compensate for the absence of security and political freedoms. No doubt a
general process of revival, and also radicalization, of religious thinking and identification
occurred. Numerous Muslims, notably of the younger generation, adopted a discourse of
‘correct’ scriptural Islam, ‘purity’, and often also exclusivist claims and dogmatism, with
agitation against the established Muslim religious authorities and practices. On the Chris-
tian side many global Pentecostals and Evangelicals (re-)connected to local Christians—
and vice versa—and started both conversion campaigns as well as social, pastoral and devel-
opment work. The new Evangelical-Protestant and Pentecostal groups in particular quickly
‘indigenized’ and generated a new dynamic of tension in the country, strongly activist and
expansive, especially toward the Ethiopian Orthodox Church—the former national church.
I.e. paradoxically, within the Christian population a discourse of mimetic rivalry regarding
the ‘right’ form of Christianity was opened up as well, continuing to this day.
Muslims connected more to foreign, especially Saudi Arabian/Middle Eastern resources
and ideas, which permeated Ethiopia in the 1990s and early 2000s via, for instance, the
Muslim World League and many private Arab funders. Thus, major centers of Salafist
and ‘Wahhabist’ (Muwahiddūn) thought and practice emerged,56 although several
already had a basis in the country; not all Ethiopian Muslims before the revivalist wave
corresponded to the stereotype of ‘quietist, non-radical’ Sufi Muslims. Muslim da’wa
groups like the Ja’amat al Tabligh (of Pakistani origins and active across Africa) and
some others also established branches in Ethiopia, and claimed large sections of the
younger generation of (notably Gurage and Borana) Muslims with their ‘reformist’ or
revivalist programs, rivaling with Sufist-mainstream and also Salafi Islam. Thus, new
Muslim identities emerged in Ethiopia.
One important center of ‘reformist’ Islam after 1991 was the ‘Awoliya Mosque and
School’ in Addis Ababa that became a kind of cadre school for young Muslim activists
and reformers, largely funded by Saudi Arabia (Muslim World League), and anti the
Muslim establishment in Ethiopia. By the latter were meant the pro-regime Muslim
leaders as represented in the government-approved Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme
Council (EIASC),57 and also the large strand of mostly rural-based Sufi sheikhs and prac-
titioners that might be considered as a form of local, popular Islam. The process of Muslim
revivalism in general reflects major socio-economic and demographic changes in Ethiopia
that have advanced the social position and public presence of Muslims and lessened their
much vaunted historical ‘marginality’.58
The process was not without actual armed conflict either. After the installation of the
new regime in May 1991 followed a period of political insecurity, and various armed
movements remained active. As in other periods of regime transition in Ethiopia,
several movements, including religion–based ones, re-emerged. One of them was the mili-
tant Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromiya (founded in 1985), influenced by Salafist
thought. It carried out a radical agenda of furthering the Muslim Oromo cause,59 including
56An in-depth overview of this role of Saudi sources and efforts, and their political aspects, was given in Haggai Erlich, Saudi
Arabia and Ethiopia. Islam, Christianity and Politics Intertwined (Boulder, Co.—London: Lynne Rienner, 2007).
57Locally called the Majlis, instituted in 1976.
58Cp. Éloi Ficquet, ‘The Ethiopian Muslims: Historical Processes and Ongoing Controversies’, in G. Prunier and E. Ficquet
(eds), Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia (London: C. Hurst), pp. 93–122.
59Ca. 55% of the Oromo, the largest people in Ethiopia, are Muslim.
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chasing out and killing non-Muslims in Oromo-inhabited areas in 1991–92. The Somalia-
based Al Ittihad al Islami (see above) also had bases in Southeast Ethiopia in the 1990s and
carried out armed attacks. There were numerous instances of Christian–Muslim clashes in
different regional states as well, including attacks on places of worship. Religion and eth-
nicity became intertwined in new local territorial conflicts. In general, more competition
emerged to redefine Ethiopia’s religious landscape and national ‘identity’.
That radical or extremist thinking also developed in the wake of the ‘religious freedom’
statute under the Constitution was evident from a new wave of polemical literature, media
products and Internet sources, in part with translated religious writings and messages by
foreign revivalist or extremist Muslim preachers-activists, like the South African Ahmed
Deedat60 or the Indian Zakir Naik.61 Many publications were circulated and YouTube
clips appeared of new preachers with harsh and dogmatic messages going against the
mainstream discourse of (predominantly) moderation and tolerance.62 As Samson has
aptly noted in a study of Zakir Naik’s influence: in this ‘hyper-reality’ of mediatized reli-
gious products, communal conflict ‘ … is generated a priori to any actual or real conflict’.63
Orthodox and Protestant-Evangelical-Christians entered the fray, either to answer the
Muslim charges or to combat each other, and deeply polemic identity battles emerged
in news magazines, DVDs and VCDs with missionizing sermons and performances
that were on sale in the streets, and in the past decade Internet sites and social media
were much used.
In 1995 there was sectarian violence within the Muslim community, including the
killing of twelve well-known religious leaders in the Anwar Mosque compound in
Addis Ababa. There were also confrontations between Orthodox Christians and Protes-
tants-Evangelicals particularly in the South of the country; and in 2006 followed deadly
Muslim–Christian clashes in western Ethiopia (Jimma city) and some other places, with
hundreds of people killed. Again, March 2011 saw another wave of attacks on places of
worship and killings in various parts of the country.
These clashes and killings in what appeared as a wave of ‘religious violence’ prompted
the Ethiopian government to devise an ‘anti-extremist’ policy towards Muslims. The per-
ception was that the growing ‘reformist’, revivalist-scriptural Islam, that had profited from
the constitutional right to religious freedom, was radicalizing people and that the common
Ethiopian Muslim masses were in danger of being hijacking by radicals and ‘fundamen-
talists’ (in Amharic: akrariwoch, ‘fanatics’). Up to a point this perception was justified,
because complaints to this effect were also heard among many Muslims. In 2008 a new
directive was already issued by the Ministry of Education to regulate the role and
expression of religious belief in educational institutions.64
60See: Samadia Sadouni, ‘Ahmed Deedat, Internationalisation, and Transformations of Islamic Polemic’, Journal of Religion in
Africa, 43:1 (2013), pp. 53–73.
61Analysed in: Samsom A. Bezabeh, ‘Living across Digital Landscapes: Muslim, Orthodox Christians and an Indian Guru in
Ethiopia’, in R.I.J. Hackett and B.F. Soares (eds), New Media and Religious Transformations in Africa (Bloomington—India-
napolis: Indiana University Press, 2015), pp. 266–283. See also: Jon Abbink, ‘Religion in Public Spaces: Emerging Muslim–
Christian Polemics in Ethiopia’, African Affairs, 110 (2011), pp. 253–274.
62A particular example was a statement via YouTube where Ethiopian Muslims said they did not accept the Constitution
and placed shari’a above it: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JwKtoBDDwTQ. Also the remarks by other Ethiopian
Muslims in the comments section were revealing (accessed May 5, 2018).
63Samson, op. cit., p. 281 (see note 42).
64BeTimhirt Tequam yeAmleko Ser’attinna beMimelekket yeWott’a Memriya (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Education, Memo,
Hidar 2000 EC (= 2008 CE)).
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Since the summer of 2011 a great clash between the government and the Muslim com-
munity emerged. At issue was ‘non-interference’ of the state in religious affairs. In July that
year the government started a ‘training program’ on constitutional issues and matters of
religion and state relations, for Muslim religious leaders. For this purpose, they invited
members of the Al-Ahbash, a Sufist association65 based in Lebanon, although with a
modest presence in Ethiopia and known for its non-political, accommodative stance in
religious matters.66 It was founded by an Ethiopian cleric, sheikh Abdullah al Harari
(1910–2006). The government of then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi thought they
could be used to inculcate a non-political Islam, in line with constitutional values, that
would connect to the presumed tolerant mainstream Sufist Islam in Ethiopia and be
against the new ‘Wahhabist’-Salafist variants that had emerged after 1991. The Ethiopian
Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC) was tasked with implementing the program
nationwide. Training sessions were indeed held in many places. But resistance against
this prescribed program was significant. It reminded people of the obligatory political
training sessions of the EPRDF ruling party on ‘developmentalism’ that were held in edu-
cational and government institutions. One of the young Muslim leaders, Abubakr Ahmed,
at the time said that they protested not the ‘sect’ (al-Ahbash) itself, but only its being held
as normative on religious doctrine and state-religion relations: ‘[Al-Ahbash] has the right
to exist in Ethiopia but it is unacceptable that the Council [the EIASC] tries to impose it on
all members of the Muslim community’.67 But in polemical work of some of his co-reli-
gionists, like Ahmedin Jebel,68 al-Ahbash was vehemently attacked on its Islamic identity.
The al-Ahbash episode and its ultimate failure are well-described in the literature.69 The
key point is that it backfired because Ethiopian Muslims, and notably the younger leader-
ship, did not want to have one version of Islam imposed on them—they rejected it appeal-
ing to the legal right to be free of ‘state interference’ in religious affairs. Whether the
Ethiopia state has or does not have the right to instruct religious leaders on consti-
tutional-legal clauses and on civic issues—i.e. on the context and limits of both state
and religious scope of action vis-à-vis each other, Art. 11.3 of the Constitution—is not
easily decided and will not be further discussed here.70 A problem here is the lack of
clear additional legislation on the ‘secular order’.
As part of the same government campaign, there was the dismissal in December 2011 of
50 Arabic language teachers from Awoliya School and the replacement of its entire admin-
istration by government nominees. This event further encouraged demonstrations of the
Muslim community, unfolding over 2012 and onwards. And in October 2012 the
65Officially called the ‘Association of Islamic Charitable Projects’.
66One of the few studies on the movement is A. Nizar Hamzeh and R. Hrair Dekmejian, ‘A Sufi Response to Political Isla-
mism: Al Ahbash of Lebanon’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28:2 (1996), pp. 217–229.
67Cited in Aaron Maasho, ‘Ethiopian Muslims Protest Government Interference’, Reuters news message, 11 May 2012.
68See Ahmedin Jebel, Ahbash and Allah’s Essence. A Response to their Confusion-Creating (Addis Ababa: n.p., 2012 [in
Amharic]).
69See Mohammed Dejen, ‘Ethiopia’s Ahbash Path for Religious Moderation and Countering Extremism: Pitfalls and Discon-
tents’, Journal for the Study of Religions of Africa and Its Diaspora, 28 (2017), pp. 110–124; Terje Østebø, ‘Salafism, State
Politics, and the Question of “Extremism” in Ethiopia’, Comparative Islamic Studies, 8:1–2 (2014), pp. 171–172, and id.,
‘Islam and State Relations in Ethiopia: from Containment to the Production of a “Governmental Islam”’, Journal of the
American Academy of Religion, 81:4 (2013), pp. 1029–1060.
70But in so far as religious life and activism touch upon the public (shared) sphere and may have an impact on civil rights
(e.g. of women within the religious communities), they cannot be categorically beyond regulation. Religious freedom is
not absolute. As far as we know, the Ahbash people did not intend to impose their (doctrinal, cultic) version of Islam on
the Ethiopian Muslims.
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government charged 29 Muslim protestors with ‘terrorism’ and ‘attempting to establish an
Islamic state’. Another step in the campaign of warnings against Muslim radicalization
was the screening in 2013 on Ethiopian state TV of a documentary called Jihadawi
Harakat, on alleged terrorist and Islamist threats in Ethiopia. The film was a quite
dubious product of suggestive editing, asserting the imminent danger of Islamist political
radicalism and plans to install an Islamic state. It was alarmist and based on tenuous ‘evi-
dence’ and half-truths. In addition, in 2015 a major section of Muslim leaders represented
in the ‘Muslim Arbitration Committee’ (18 of the 22), were sentenced to long prison
terms.71 While the Muslim protests petered out over 2015 due to repression and
cooptation, again in January 2017 twenty Muslim activists were sentenced to prison,
found guilty of ‘trying to establish a state ruled by Sharia law and inciting violence’
under Art.7(1) of Ethiopia’s harsh 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (Procl. Nr. 652/
2009)72 and under criminal charges for violating articles 32(1) (a) and 38(1) of the
Penal Code of 2004.
In all these matters the government overstated its case, because no clear evidence of ter-
rorist activities or movements was available. It does not mean that among Ethiopian
Muslims radical or extremist ideas and enmity toward other faiths were absent; only
they did not lead to organizational-operational expression.73 Religion-based violence
was only visible in various local clashes between faith communities around concrete
cases, such as new mosque or church building, burial site choice, excessive religious
sound production, contested conversion efforts, or perceived ‘insults’ of the other faith’s
religious scriptures.
In short, Muslim leaders in Ethiopia embraced the secular constitutional statute and
expected its promise of mutual non-interference of state and religion to be honored: i.e.
no ‘policing’ of the nature of their Muslim identity, be it Salafist-‘Wahhabist’ or ‘Sufist’.
The mass demonstrations of Muslims in 2012–2014 against the state authorities and
the discourse of protest by their leaders were framed with a strong appeal to the Consti-
tution and its granting all religious groups freedom in community organization; Muslims
should be granted autonomy, the right to choose their own leaders and organizations, have
their own religious schools, media, etc. This was supported by the Muslim religious refor-
mists around the Awoliya School as well as by what Østebø and Shemsedin74 have termed
the ‘Intellectualist’ group—Muslim professionals, teachers, students, urban-based traders,
etc., with no ‘extremist’ agenda but rather a wish to see Muslim identity and concerns
reflected or represented in the public debates on Ethiopia’s political order.
The Ethiopian case is interesting in comparative perspective: on the one hand, incidents
of religious violence have not been scarce, and tension between the faith communities
increased significantly, leading to competitive relations, identity politics and separation,
with possibly negative consequences. The incidents in the post-1991 period (some of
them clearly terrorist) thus testify to a subtext of religious antagonism. But large-scale reli-
gion-based violent movements, as in Somalia, Kenya75 or Nigeria, have not lasted, and
71Four of the 17 were released on 14 February 2018.
72See the text on: https://chilot.me/2011/01/a-proclamation-on-anti-terrorism-proclamation-no-6522009 (accessed
October 8, 2018). This law was rescinded in 2018, under the new prime minister Abiy Ahmed.
73Except possibly some underground movements.
74See: Terje Østebø and Wallelign Shemsedin, ‘Ethiopian Muslims and the Discourse about Moderation’, Journal of Modern
African Studies, 55:2 (2017), pp. 225–249.
75Cf. Hassan Ndzovu, op. cit. (see note 48).
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armed escalation along a path of imitative rivalry has not solidified. The Muslim protests of
the past decade were consistent in appealing to the secular statute giving them autonomy,
and did not develop violent contestation. They did not call for constitutional change and
state overthrow. Things might change, however, if the Muslims would gain the demographic
majority in the country. Several of my Muslim informants in Addis Ababa stated that when
this would be the case, then, for instance, the statute of shari’a would have to be upgraded
and expanded. What this would mean for the secular constitutional model is a moot point.
But so far, Muslim leaders in large majority have tried to maintain and rhetorically
cultivate an accommodative stance. Terrorism is utterly rejected. In 2015, when ISIS adher-
ents in chaotic Libya decapitated ca. 40 Orthodox Christian Ethiopian migrants, the Ethio-
pian Muslim Supreme Council leaders, supported by a majority of Muslims in the country,
expressed their abhorrence.76 In the digital domain, however, major religious rivalry is still
enacted, and religious polemics as well as calls to radical reform and militant defense of the
faith are rampant, showing clear signs of discursive extremism in certain sub-communities.
This affects all major faith blocs (Protestants-Evangelicals, the Orthodox, and Muslims, with
no doubt jihadist elements present) and keeps the subtext of tension alive, especially in the
polemics on the contents of the other’s faith (i.e. Christians vs. Muslims and vice versa, as
well as within the faiths). This is a contentious issue because of the strong universalist
‘truth claims’ made; they are thus a classic example of the mimetic rivalry that Girard has
identified, be it in the form not of actual but verbal warfare.
Jos, Nigeria: the deadlock of mimetic religious rivalry
Contrasting developments in Somalia and Ethiopia with the situation in the city of Jos,
Nigeria, is instructive. Nigeria is a country divided almost equally between Christians
and Muslims, but with highly contested religious fault lines and intense rivalries. In Jos,
with over 1 million people, such militant communal-religious rivalry has taken over the
city and totally redefined—read: blighted—the urban public domain.77 The city has a
slight majority of Christians (of various ethnic backgrounds) over Muslim inhabitants
and lies in the border area between the predominantly Muslim North and the largely
Christian South of Nigeria. Jos is the capital of Plateau State, which has a majority of
Christians but is wedged into the Muslim majority states of the North. Although
Nigeria has a secular constitution without a state religion and with state neutrality
toward organized religious constituencies, the federal authorities in Abuja have over the
years condoned the gradual installing of Islam as the official religion of the northern
Nigerian states (provinces) and the introduction of Muslim shari’a as state law there.
This contravened the federal constitution,78 but was adopted (a) to appease northern
Muslim elites, who saw it as a means to strengthen their power and whose federal
loyalty might be bought with it, and (b) to give in to pressure from some sectors from
76See: ‘Ethiopian Muslims Dedicate Friday Prayers to ISIL Victims’, http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/158255/ethiopian-
muslims-dedicate-friday-prayers-to-isil-victims (accessed May 13, 2015).
77See Ulrika Trovalla, ‘Competing Prayers: The Making of a Nigerian Urban Landscape’, Anthropology Southern Africa, 38:3–4
(2015), pp. 302–313. Also: Jana Krause, A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria (Geneva:
Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2011), and id. ‘Gender Dimensions of (Non)Violence in Communal Conflict: The Case
of Jos, Nigeria’, Comparative Political Studies, 52:10 (2019), pp. 1466–1499.
78The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, Chapter 1, Art. 10, says: ‘The Government of the Federation or a State shall not adopt any
religion as State Religion’, www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ng/ng014en.pdf.
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society to circumvent the slow and corrupt state justice system. In fact, the recent history
of Nigeria is bloody especially in inter-communal relations, with enormous tensions exist-
ing between the faith communities, fought out in an atmosphere of perennial rivalry and
alternative visions on what the Nigerian state should be.
The deep rivalries between the two communities in Jos have a material basis (inequality,
resource rivalry, unemployment) but emerged partly in the shadow of this national con-
troversy on the status of Islam and shari’a in law. In addition, issues of ‘indigeneity’ of
ethnic populations and faith communities in the city (founded officially in 1915 around
tin mining) have stimulated gradual extremist self-identification for political purposes
and led to contagious, entrenched religious identities. No doubt the afore-mentioned
issues of socio-economic inequality and ‘resource competition’ were in the background,
not only in Jos itself but also in the surrounding rural areas, where (mostly Christian)
farmers regularly clashed with (Muslim) cattle-herders.79 But in fact it could be said
that the extremist mindset was created before the actual violence started. Social relations
in Jos, relatively amicable and business-like in the past, were slowly but surely restructured
on the basis of religious identity and even became deeply territorially anchored (with no-
go neighborhoods). Apparently, any moderating legal regulation failed in this case; the
ambivalent and in fact faltering national policy engendered, or at least condoned, extre-
mism to emerge in the city, making it a contested ‘battlefield’ in Nigerian religious politics.
The militant self-identification, religious posturing and identity politics on both sides pro-
duced a pervasive politics of space and antagonism that urged the two communities to
constantly vie for power and dominance. Road blocks, massive prayers gatherings congest-
ing the streets, and deafening religious sound production frommosques and churches soli-
dified the divisions and the competition. Religious polemics—arguments about even the
‘validity’ of religious doctrine—became vehement as well, and a subtext of discursive vio-
lence was thus instituted that entered local politics and converted into actual violence in
moments of lapse or crisis. Ulrika Trovalla’s disturbing study of this city80 is exemplary in
describing the process, demonstrating a mimetic rivalry that is self-propelling, destructive,
and not contained by mediating state policy. Local authorities were indeed unable to
address the violence, aggravated by a murderous attack on churches in Jos by the ‘Boko
Haram’ movement in 2010. An extremist mentality was thus created and reproduced,
space for dialogue and exchange became precarious, and differences were essentialized.
Also, in this urban context of conflict and enemy-labeling, and with ‘territorial’ disputes
at the order of the day, the absence of successful joint civic, let alone religious, dialogue
to perform unity, reinforced a tendency of ‘escalation into extremes’,81 with numerous
violent incidents, including ‘silent killings’. Between August 2013 and December 2014
there finally was an initiative by the ‘Humanitarian Dialogue Jos Forum’ to establish
peace between the communities, with a Declaration of Commitment to Peace signed by
representatives of ethnic communities and women’s delegations. But in May 2014
bomb attacks killed 118 people, and again, in December 2014 in another round, at least
30 people were killed in twin bombings. In 2015 a Jos Peace Dialogue Forum was installed
to further try bridging the communal divides, despite continuing religious-communal
79For example, in March 2010 attacks carried out by Fulani herdsmen in Dogo Na Hauwa, a village south of Jos, left more
than 500 people dead. See https://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/world/africa/09nigeria.html (accessed July 11, 2015).
80Trovalla, op. cit.
81See above, note 17.
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agitation. Deadlock and a balance of fear between the religious communities have marked
the urban space of Jos, despite emerging but fragile local initiatives to counter them. In the
countryside near Jos mass violence spread, as in June 2018 with attacks of Fulani Muslims
on Christian villagers, resulting in more than 200 people killed.
The Jos example shows the crucial role of state policy: it was absent, although its task
would be to maintain or (re)set the terms of interaction and regulate religious life and
communal conflicts as they arise. There is nothing ‘inevitable’ about religious rivalries
being acted out and escalating into violence, rioting and terror. To some extent, this
was shown by the Ethiopian example, where the, admittedly, repressive and exaggerated
state policy towards Muslim revivalism and militancy (and several Christian polemical
accusations) unjustly labeled the community as ‘extremist’ but still had the effect of
dampening escalation, however controversial the process was.82 Interesting was that the
‘scapegoating’ approach of the Ethiopian state towards Muslims (cf. the row on the docu-
mentary film Jihadawi Harakat, above)—accusing them of an agenda of violence—even
evoked criticism from Christians, supporting the Muslim cause.
Jos is a diverse city with multiple religious (sub-)communities, self-advertising as such.
Neither took responsibility for good relations or interaction with any other community—it
had to come from elsewhere. It would seem that the basic fact of religious pluralism in
African countries and its durability necessitate the mediating intervention of constitutionally
mandated state authorities to create amiddle-ground of negotiation and accommodation, and
of de-emphasizing religion as a politically relevant identity in the public sphere. African state
authorities do not play this role well, due to autocratic approaches, divide-and-rule tactics,
institutional weakness, opportunism, and lack of accountability. But still, the legal (consti-
tutional) framework to pursue this middle ground is there, and might be elaborated with
additional law-giving. In the case of Jos there was a glaring lack of state action; a lack which
also led to ‘contagion’ and expansion of religion-based violence to other places in Nigeria.
Conclusion: the role of the political-legal regime vs. religious organization
and violent mobilization
Religious extremism and violence are visible in Africa in the past two decades, evolved from
historical domestic sources and inspired by new Islamist models from the Middle East and
Asia. While issues of unequal access to ‘resources’, skewed distribution of public goods,
and discriminatory practices always play a role in collectively mobilizing people, the role of
ideology is ultimately crucial. When activated, it becomes primary, notably in Islamist resur-
gence, and whenmilitarized or ‘securitized’, the ‘struggle’ is often seen in global, even cosmic,
terms: against ‘fake’Muslims (via takfiri labeling), against non-Muslims, and against the state
authorities so as to usher in a kind of Islamist state or khalifate (which are, however, conceived
in vague terms). Themodel has proven contagious andwas adopted by scores of youths, min-
orities and social groups constructing their vulnerabilities and perceptions of neglect and vic-
timhood into a discourse of militancy and intimidation that often turned ‘jihadist’. State
policies and legal frameworks haveoftenneither been able norwilling to connect to and incor-
porate these groups or to address their needs.
82See the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) 2017 Annual Report (Washington, DC, 2017), criticizing
the heavy 2015 sentence against Muslim activists ‘ … convicted of plotting to institute an Islamic government’, p. 198.
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As we saw in the case studies, however, the local political culture and the nature of the
legal regime make the big difference for contagious patterns of extremist and violent
mobilization to occur. While in Somalia the Islamist armed militants of Al-Shabaab
and allied clerics categorically rejected the emerging federal legal system and the idea of
a constitution proclaimed by a ‘worldly’ or elected government, in Ethiopia Muslims
across the board accepted and appealed to the 1995 Constitution that granted religious
freedom and non-interference in religious affairs by the state. Their revolt in 2011–2015
was against the state not respecting these rights and blatantly interfering in the internal
affairs of the organized Muslim community (in Addis Ababa especially) and in cultic
matters. They did not develop a ‘political theology’ and did not take up arms—except
in a few incidents—or go the road to terrorism, despite the government at one point
reproaching them for wanting to install an Islamist state.
This difference between the two countries shows that the specifics of the local legal
context, as well as the pattern of historical relations and inter-dependencies between
Muslims and other groups in society, are of crucial importance—a development
towards extremism and religiously-fueled violence is never inevitable. The demographic
factor is also relevant: in Somalia: 99% is Muslim, and sectarian and clan-based differences
became important; Ethiopia is 61% Christian and 34% Muslim, and the balance was pre-
carious.83 The third case—Jos, Nigeria—was the most antagonistic, with a 55–45% Islam
vs. Christian divide, and here the issue of numerical dominance was very tense. But most
importantly, there was also a weak observance of national law and juridical procedures by
the Nigerian state authorities—and a resulting lack of popular trust in them. This was con-
ducive to generating a mimetic cycle of rivalry and violent actions that is not easy to break.
In such cases—and for understanding the emergence and development of religious/ter-
rorist violence in general—R. Girard’s theory shows great analytical value, showing what
mechanisms are at play. The study of religiously inspired violence in Africa can be placed
in a wider frame of study of violence and the sacred.84 Once that cycle of violence is in
place, notions of ‘purity’, ‘sacred values’ and ‘(self)sacrifice’ become the motivating
factors in the perpetration of violent and terrorist acts against those framed as ‘opponents’,
‘enemies’ and ‘unbelievers’. This religiously-based violence, however, is not ‘sacrificial’.
The deflectionary role of (sacrificial) violence via religious ritual (à la Girard) is usually
absent under modern conditions, or is sometimes not applicable. The political-legal
regime and the reach of the state hereby become of great importance.
But is there a ‘secular’ cure for religiously styled (extremist) violence of the kind dis-
cussed here, e.g. in Somalia’s or Nigeria’s case? Can presumably neutral law-giving and
enforcement by the state, trying to push religious violence out of the public domain, regu-
late or domesticate it? In view of African peoples’ strong commitment to and socialization
in religion as an ensemble of lived, embodied practices and as vessels of common identity
and ultimate meaning, that is a challenge, especially if perceived grievances and identity
concerns of religious communities are already politicized. But what can be done is to
contest, and suppress if need be, all religious discourse/ideology aimed at denigrating,
insulting or threatening other religious or non-religious or ethical communities, and to
prohibit illegitimate acts of violence in any form. I.e. the political use of religion, being
83The remaining 5% are traditional believers and others.
84See M. Juergensmeyer, ed., Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World (London: Frank Cass, 1992).
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a totalizing move threatening and/or scapegoating others, is better avoided. Engaging reli-
giously-based extremism and terrorism as in a ‘war’ is probably incorrect, because it fuels a
mimetic model and cycle that will be endless and goes beyond the law. The move of states
resorting to an exclusive ‘securitization’ policy toward militant religious movements is
usually counter-productive and does not solve the issues.85
The analysis of the three case studies thus shows the risks of ambivalent political struc-
tures that insufficiently regulate and implement laws regarding religious life and commu-
nal politics in a pluralist society and that fail to assert the primacy of the political over the
religious in the public-civic domain. This lack of action can lead to spiraling competition
and mimetic rivalry, which then take on a (violent) dynamic of their own. Political choices
made out of expediency by state authorities (like condoning sub-national authorities to
declare Islamic law as state law, as in Nigeria, or privileging one religious/ethnic group
or elite over another) often make room for ideologies of religious extremism to assert
themselves. Such choices then also allow militants to follow up their ideological assump-
tions about in- and exclusion, purity, and supremacy with conversion into violent action,
including terrorism. Once this cycle is set in motion it is not easily stopped.
The incontrovertible religious and cultural pluralism of African countries, including
those where violent, religion-inspired or terrorist movements are active, invites a strength-
ening of and judicial institutions and law and of mediating frameworks of communal inter-
action, the creating or safeguarding of a public space that encompasses religious diversity
and tensions. It might be argued that in fact there is no other choice than to strongly elab-
orate such more ‘neutral’, accommodating legal structures. The latter need not be dogma-
tically secular, in the sense of being ‘anti’ this or that religion, or banishing them frompublic
presence and input, but should mark discursive political and legal space that could allow
(religious) communities to interact and deliberate86 about their differences to find shared
underlying values and achieve workable compromise in quotidian social practice.
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